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PATENTS AND ATOMIC ENERGY*
JAmEs R. NEwMANt AND BYRON S. MnLxE4
In the patents section of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Section ix),' two basic
concepts, each regarded as fundamental to our political system, collided head-on.
These were security, as we had with some dismay begun to understand the term in
the beginning of the atomic age, and the institution of private property, as expressed
here in the hallowed forms of the patent system. The conflict between these irrecon-
cilables was reflected in the debate over most of the major provisions of the Act,
but nowhere was it so clearly defined and so bitter as in the struggle over the patent
provisions.
The simple expedient whereby during the war private patent applications in-
volving the national security were kept secret by the Commissioner of Patents
provided only a partial solution. This action was authorized by an Act of Congress 2
passed during the first World War, which empowered the Commissioner to keep
certain inventions secret and withold the issuance of certain patents in wartime.
Although this power was broadened in 19403 to authorize the Commissioner to
withhold the issuance of patents of military value for such periods as he might
determine, presumably the Act of 194o extends only to applications filed in wartime,
and those filed after the end of the war would not be covered. Nor would the
statute4 under which atomic energy inventions were handled during the war prove
helpful, since that law is limited to government-owned inventions. In any event,
all these techniques merely postponed issuance of the patent-none contemplated
control of the patent after issuance.
The very nature of the patent system requires the disclosure in detail of the device
or process to be patented. In the patent application there must be a description of
the invention and its manufacture and use "in such full, clear, concise and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected . . . ." to duplicate it. Thus, if a new
device for producing fissionable material were patentable, the patent application
would of necessity recite every relevant detail, the patent would be published, and
*This article is based upon material appearing in a forthcoming book by the authors to be pub-
lished in the fall by McGraw-Hill-Whittlesey House Publishing Company, entitled THE CONTROL OV
AToMeC ENERGY. The work was made possible through a grant from the Guggenheim Foundation.
"-Member of the New York bar; former counsel to Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy;
member, editorial board, Tim NEw REPuBLIC.
t Formerly Associate General Counsel, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, now Midwest
Director, Commission on Law and Social Action, American Jewish Congress.
160 STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §18i (Supp. 1946).
2 40 STAT. 394 (1917), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §42 (940).
a54 STAT. 71o, 35 U. S. C. §42 (94O).
'REV. STAT. §4894 (1875), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §37 (1940).
'REv. STAT. §4888 (1875), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §33 (1940).
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all information contained in it would be made public. The alternative to this pro-
cedure, vaguely advocated by those who objected to the provisions actually incorpo-
rated in the Act, was to establish a category of permanently secret patents. This
concept is so obviously absurd-one need only imagine the confusion which would
be generated whenever "secret" patents became the subject of litigation-that it
never received serious consideration in Congress. The issue was clearly defined
and could not be compromised. Congress had to decide whether to protect property
rights embodied in patents at the expense of national security, or to protect national
security at the expense of patent rights.
The House of Representatives was so stalwart in its defense of property rights
that at one stage in its deliberations it adopted as a substitute for the patent pro-
visions passed by the Senate a series of provisions, prepared by the ranking majority
member of the Patents Committee of the House, which, omitted any reference
whatever to the need for secrecy in certain types of atomic energy devices, and cre-
ated no machinery to provide it. This ready willingness to waive the need for
secrecy where it impinged on the institution of private property provides an in-
teresting contrast to the zeal with which the House voted the death penalty for un-
authorized dissemination of "restricted data."
The House had perhaps been impressed by the example set by the officials of the
Manhattan District. Seldom have the military guardians of our national security so
convincingly demonstrated their whole-hearted and uncritical loyalty to the in-
stitutions of our system as in their devoted adherence to the ritualism of patent pro-
cedures during the development of the atomic bomb. A brief but impressive
demonstration of this loyalty is provided in the testimony before the Senate Special
Committee of one Captain Robert A. Lavender, U.S.N., Retired, Chief Patent
Adviser to the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Captain Lavender,
having revealed that there were patents on file covering every detail of atomic
energy development, immediately soothed the fears of the senators by assuring
them that these patents had had "special handling," that no more than a few people
were acquainted with their contents, and that the patents were kept "in separate
safes" in the Patent Office. The senators were particularly perturbed as to the status
of the data on the atomic bomb itself. Captain Lavender reassured the Committee
that the economy was safe, that infringement suits against the government need not
be feared, "that the bombs are covered by applications." But the Chairman, Senator
McMahon, persisted in his puzzlement. "I wonder," he asked, "what is the necessity
for covering the bomb itself by applications for patents." Captain Lavender replied
cogently: "Well, it is very important for this reason: I knew that as soon as the
bomb went off there would be a great deal of speculation among various scientists
and others, engineers, who had not been connected with the project. I knew that
a great many applications would be filed in the Patent Office, so I was interested in
having filed in the Patent Office these applications, so that if any applications were
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filed and we got into interference, the Government would not be suffering the
handicap of being the second one to file, because the first to file has a great advantage
from an interference procedure point of view."'
Neither the Chairman nor Senator Millikin felt that this entirely met the causes
of their disquiet, nor did Captain Lavender's disclosure of "another special han-
dling"--a kind of special, special handling-for atomic bomb applications convince
the Committee that the secrets had been as zealously guarded as the Government's
legal rights. However, there can be litde doubt that any private person who built
an atomic bomb would be infringing on the property of the people of the United
States, and liable to a civil suit.
In the end, the Senate provisions were accepted, and the patent section as enacted
emerged radical and untempered. While taking meticulous care that no property
rights should be modified without adequate compensation, and that future dis-
coveries and inventions should be suitably rewarded, Section ii revokes all patent
rights, present and future, which might endanger the security of the country or
interfere in any manner with the full development of atomic energy-both in its
military and non-military applications. Where the privileges of the patent system
seemed to hold a threat to the national security, they were altogether abandoned.
Where there was doubt that patents issued in the field of atomic energy would
serve as a spur to inventive genius and contribute to development, and the possibility
existed that such patents might be used to stifle development or to strengthen
monopolistic practices, the system was modified. The resulting provisions make a
unique pattern among American institutions. All patents are abolished in certain
areas monopolized by the government, and sweeping government control is estab-
lished in all other parts of the general field. The Atomic Energy Commission,
under the policy directives of the Act, is required to use these powers to promote
private enterprise, to develop and utilize atomic energy, and to strengthen free
competition. Coupled with these policy objectives, Section ii can be interpreted
as a recognition of the fact that, as it normally operates, the patent system does not
inevitably generate these results, and that at least in the field of atomic energy, if
they are to be realized, powerful and continuing assistance may be required.
The atomic energy control system is complicated because the Act distinguishes
sharply among the types of activities in the field, and attempts to apply to each
activity a control no more drastic than its character requires. The major divisions of
activity in the field of atomic energy were established as follows: transactions in-
volving source materials; the manufacture of devices for the production of fissionable
material; the production of fissionable material; the production of military weapons
utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy; the utilization of fissionable material
or atomic energy for medical therapy; the utilization of fissionable material or
'Hear'ngs before Senate Specidal Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 717, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
345-347 (i946).
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atomic energy for commercial and industrial purposes; and research and develop-
ment on any of the above, as well as in nuclear processes and the theory of atomic
energy. The breakdown of functions for purposes of the system of patent controls
is somewhat less complex; but the categories established roughly parallel those of
the general control system. Together, the patent provisions and controls serve as
integral parts of one general system, as will be seen in the chart on page 749,
which summarizes much of the material in this paper.
I
DEvicEs UsED IN PRODUCTION OF FIssIoNABLE MATERIAL AND MILITARY WEAPONS
A. Single-Use Devices
The Act prohibits the patenting of any invention which is "useful solely in the
production of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or
atomic energy for a military weapon."' Patents of this description now in force are
expressly revoked, with the proviso that "just compensation shall be made there-
for."'  Here, as in the establishment of a production monopoly for fissionable
material and of information controls, there is clearly shown the determination of
Congress to preserve at any cost the safeguards deemed necessary for national
security. In this instance the subject matter to be safeguarded is the data of nuclear
physics and nuclear engineering. Only by removing from the normal routine of
the patent system inventions and discoveries incorporating such data can the in-
formation be kept, even briefly, in a restricted status.
While the scope of this section seems extremely sweeping, its practical implica-
tions should not be exaggerated. Under other provisions of the Act the inventor
of a production device could not, were he able to secure a patent, manufacture the
device without a license from the Commission, or utilize the invention himself, or
license its use to anyone other than the Government. Since he is assured of a
reward commensurate with the novelty, utility, and importance of his invention
under the compensation provisions, the denial of patent rights should for him
have little more than semantic significance. This is particularly true since, under
an existing statute,' the inventor of a device desired by the Government for its own
use can neither withhold it from the Government nor even fix the royalty, which
is determined by the Court of Claims.
Similar principles hold for devices useful solely in the utilization of fissionable
material or atomic energy for a military weapon: the device cannot be manufactured
except with the express authorization of the Commission; the Government alone
is authorized to use an atomic energy weapon; adequate compensation will be paid
to the inventor for any useful military device. Under these circumstances, to deny
the inventor patent rights is to deprive him of nothing of practical value.
16o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §i8xi(a)(i) (Supp. 1946).
S6o STAr. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §x811(a)(2) (Supp. 1946).
936 STAT. 851 (igio), as amended, 35 U. S. C. §68 (940).
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The discussion so far has been confined to the inventions and discoveries of the
future. Many private patents, embracing devices and processes basic to the pro-
duction and use of fissionable material, were, however, granted before the adoption
of the Atomic Energy Act. According to testimony before the Senate Special Com-
mittee, all of the principal inventions for which patent applications were filed were
assigned to the government' 0 Whether or not the public interest in this project,
financed entirely at public expense, was in fact so scrupulously served is known for
certain only to the select fraternity who were made cognizant of the contents of Cap-
tain Lavender's "separate safes" at the Patent Office. In any event, all outstanding
private patents are automatically revoked by this subsection, and the appearance or
non-appearance of claims for compensation will constitute the best evidence on the
subject.
How is a manufacturer (and patent owner) of a presently existing device for
the production of fissionable material (or for its utilization in a military weapon)
affected? To begin with, it should be recalled that the manufacturer of a pro-
duction facility (or an atomic weapon) cannot continue such manufacture without
a license from the Commission.'1 If he receives a license, he may continue to
produce the device for the use of the Commission even though his patent rights
are revoked. Revocation of the patent rights, however, permits the Commission
at its discretion to license other manufacturers to produce the same device. Pre-
sumably, in determining the compensation to be awarded to the patentee the number
of such licenses will be considered. In other words, the amount of royalties the
inventor could have earned by licensing or otherwise, had his patent not been
revoked by this subsection, is the main factor to be weighed in fixing his compensa-
tion.
B. Multiple-Use Devices
The treatment under the Act of inventions useful solely in the production of
fissionable material or military weapons is a relatively straightforward matter.
Inventions with multiple uses-i., useful both in the field of atomic energy and in
other fields-present a more difficult problem. Section ii(a) (2) revokes every
patent on an invention or discovery having multiple uses "to the extent that such
invention or discovery is used in the production of fissionable material or in the
utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon."' Just
compensation is also required for patents partially revoked pursuant to this section.
Complicated problems will certainly arise in determining when a device is
"used in" the production of fissionable material. The sub-section in question con-
tains no qualifying language and may be construed to cover every possible tool,
machine, process, etc., which is or could be used to keep the Oak Ridge or Hanford
installations in operation. The device need not be "specially designed" (cf. com-
" Heaings cited supra, note 6 at 342.
6o STAT. 759, 42 U. S. C. A. §1804(e) (Supp. 1946).
116o STArT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §1811(a)(2) (Supp. 1946).
752 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ponents of production facilities-Section 18(g));13 it need not be "peculiarly
adapted" (cf. utilization equipment-Section i8(f));14 it need not be "essential"
for the production of fissionable material (cf. condemnation authority-Section
i1(d)).1 Whether the patent covers a stepladder, a hammer, a pump, an electrical
transformer, a cyclotron, a chemical process, or an industrial design for supporting
concrete flooring; whether or not the device (or process) is peculiarly useful or
essential in the production of fissionable material-all of these factors are immaterial
if the device is in fact used in such production.
Here again, its scope is a poor guide to the section's practical applications.
Consider, for example, the case of high-vacuum pumps. These pumps, useful in
certain phases of isotope separation, are also useful in other industrial processes.
As sole producer of fissionable material, the Commission will probably buy the
pumps rather than make its own. Most likely it will procure them from the
patentee or one of his licensees. But since patent rights in the pump are revoked
in so far as it is employed in the production of fissionable material, the Commission
may purchase pumps from other manufacturers licensed by it. Research institutions
in this field may also buy pumps from these other manufacturers if the Commission
licenses them. Unless the Commission grants a license under Section 4(e), 10 no
manufacturer may take advantage of the partial patent revocation. As a matter of
practice, the Commission will probably do so only when there is a real object to be
served in so doing. The determination of just compensation in cases involving
partial revocation is likely to prove difficult and vexatious, and the Commission
will hardly undertake to buy from a manufacturer not authorized under the patent
without reason.
II
DEVICES USED IN RESEARCH
In the treatment of patents there is accorded to research the same status of
privilege which it enjoys throughout the Atomic Energy Act. Section ii(b) eman-
cipates from the scope of the patent system "any invention or discovery to the
extent that such invention or discovery is used in the conduct of research or develop-
ment activities in the fields specified in Section 3." This section, it will be recalled,
embraces all research in nuclear science and in the many fields-medicine, engineer-
ing, chemistry-applying the knowledge gained through nuclear explorations.
Existing patents are revoked "to the extent" the inventions they cover are used
in research; patents "granted hereafter" confer no rights as regards use in research;
just compensation is to be made for every partial revocation of an existing patent.
The general purposes of this section are three: one, to permit the use of apparatus
in the conduct of research free of patent restrictions and characteristic patent abuses;
236o STAT. 774, 42 U. S. C. A. §xSI8(g) (Supp. 1946).
"60 STAT. 774, 42, U. S. C. A. §I8x8(f) (Supp. 1946).
t6o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §i8Ix(d) (Supp. 1946).
1"6o STAT. 759, 42 U. S. C. A. §I804(e) (Supp. 1946).
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two, to permit research workers to construct their own apparatus without fear of
infringing on existing patents and without being forced to seek licenses or pay
royalties; three, to encourage, or at least to remove obstacles to, the improvement
of existing scientific apparatus by rendering less profitable the expedient of suppress-
ing inventions.
To clarify the meaning of this subsection it will be necessary to consider two
types of devices: those which fall unambiguously in the class of scientific instruments,
useful solely for research; and those which are used in experimental work but serve
other purposes as well.
The cyclotron may be taken as an example of the class of scientific instruments
useful solely in nuclear research. Assume that A holds patents on a certain type of
cyclotron, and manufactures it for commercial distribution. It is not to be inferred
that the patents held by A are automatically revoked as they would be if the device
which they covered were, for example, useful solely in the production of fissionable
material. The patentee retains the exclusive right to make, sell or use the cyclotron
for any purpose other than atomic research. But there is a partial revocation of A's
patents with the following consequences:
(i) It is permissible to make17 a replica of A's product, for use in one's own
research, without infringing A's patents;
(2) It is permissible to make a replica of A's product (or to purchase one of his
cyclotrons) for the purpose of redesigning or improving the instrument itself. In
other words, A's cyclotron may be used as a subject of research, as distinguished from
a tool in the course of research, and this activity also may be conducted independ-
ently of A's patents rights. It should be noted that under the well-established legal
doctrine of "experimental use," the reproduction of a patented device for the pur-
pose of experimenting on the device itself is not deemed a patent infringement.
But judicial decisions in such cases are neither uniform in reasoning nor consistent
in result, particularly in actions for patent infringement where the defendant has
been found to be experimenting with a "commercial incentive." Such crevices of
uncertainty seem to be sealed by the language of the Atomic Energy Act. Since
subsection 3(a) (2) provides for research on "processes" and "devices," and since the
present subsection (ii (b)) covers the use of inventions in the course of the research
described in Section 3, there can be no doubt that the "incentives" of the research
worker have no bearing on his exemption from patent restrictions.
(3) It is not permissible either to manufacture a replica of A's product for, or
to sell such a replica to, a person who will use it in research, even nuclear research.
There remains for examination the class of multi-use devices in the field of
nuclear research. Here again, the principles noted with respect to multi-use devices
in production and in military weapons apply. Consider, for example, the case of a
27 The law reads: "to the extent that such invention or discovery is used in the conduct of research."
Strictly, "use" may be distinguished from "make," but the intent to free atomic research from a patent
owner's unwillingness to make or sell his invention would be thwarted if this interpretation were not
adopted.
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manufacturer of a patented electrical transformer which, in addition to certain
industrial uses, is valuable for research in the chemistry of plutonium. So far as
this provision is concerned, he continues to hold his patent rights against all users
except those using the transformer in the course of nuclear research.
Compensation, it will be noted, is provided only for partial revocation of existing
patents. Future patents confer no rights with respect to inventions used in the con-
duct of research. Determination of such compensation is not likely to prove too
troublesome. While scientists may build their own apparatus, in practice they, or the
institutions with which they are affiliated, will probably continue to purchase the
instruments needed for research from the manufacturer, who, in turn, is the patent
owner or a licensee. With compensation dependent on "actual use,""8 neither the
volume of cases nor the size of awards is likely to be substantial.
It should be remarked, however, that the term "development" is broader than
research, including, as defined in the Act, the extension of investigative findings and
theories "into practical application for experimenta" and demonstration purposes."'
The use of inventions in the conduct of research and development, free of patent
rights, means something more than the use made by the occasional sciendst
tinkering or building his own tools in the laboratory. It means that industrial
laboratories engaged in large-scale nuclear research-the production of atomic power,
for example-can build all their facilities and apparatus without regard to outstand-
ing patents. This may require substantial "partial revocation" awards to holders of
patents existing at the time the Act went into effect.
III
NON-PRODUCTION AND NON-MILITARY DEVICES
In treating patents on devices of significance in the field of atomic energy, other
than production or military devices, Congress sought to preserve the basic right to
patent while eliminating the more glaring abuses which have come to mark the
system.
Such devices may be of two sorts: (I) they may utilize fissionable material or
atomic energy for industrial, commercial, therapeutic, or other purposes, or (2) they
may be altogether outside the field of atomic energy but nevertheless essential to
the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy. For the sake of convenience,
we shall hereafter refer to devices of the first sort as "ordinary atomic energy de-
vices," and to those of the second as "ancillary devices."20
Manufacture of the ordinary atomic energy device will require a license issued by
the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. But the Act
186o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §z8rx(e)(3) (Supp. 1946).
"960 STAT. 774, 42 U. S. C. A. §s8i8(e) (Supp. 1946).
2 0 1t is impossible for a layman to say with any certainty just what an ordinary atomic energy
device might be. The reader is at liberty to conjure up his own private marvels, but to give aid to
those whose imaginations do not respond immediately to this stimulus, we suggest as a plausible device
a small reactor, burning nuclear fuel, which would be used to propel a ship.
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requires of the Commission an interest in the ordinary device which extends greatly
beyond the mere licensing of its production. It is charged with the carrying out of
a declared policy which will assure that "the development and utilization of atomic
energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare,
increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enter-
prise . . .,"; it is required to administer "a program for government production,
ownership and use of fissionable material . . . to insure the broadest possible ex-
ploitation of the fields."'22  To effect these policies, the Commission will need to
maintain a firm and continuing supervision over ordinary atomic energy devices, and
to make certain that patents on devices essential to the utilization of atomic energy
shall not be permitted to obstruct developments.
When the patent application on the ordinary device is filed, the Patent Office will
notify the Commission. In the case of ancillary devices, the probability is that the
initiative in securing a declaration that a patent is affected with public interest
will be taken by some licensee who finds that his operations are being hampered
by his inability to use the device in question. In any case, the Patent Commissioner
is required to provide the Commission access to applications filed. The Commission
may, if it thinks the situation warrants, declare a patent in either category-that is,
covering an ordinary atomic energy device or an ancillary device--"affected with the
public interest." The making of this declaration has the following effects :23
(i) The Commission is automatically licensed to use the device covered by the
patent "in performing any of its powers under the Act";
(2) Any person to whom a license has been issued under Section 7 is authorized
to use the patent declared so affected to the extent the invention it covers "is used
by him in carrying on the activities authorized by his license under Section 7."
What circumstances make it the "duty of the Commission to declare any patent
to be affected with the public interest?" Section ii (c) (i) sets forth these criteria:
(i) "the invention or discovery covered by the patent utilizes or is essential in the
utilization of atomic energy"; and (2) the licensing of the invention or discovery
under this subsection "is necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes" of the Act.
Any invention which is covered by the definition of an "ordinary atomic energy
device" meets the first condition. But an ancillary device which does not utilize
fissionable material may also be included so long as it is "essential' in such utili-
zation. What is "essential?" Presumably, it is a device or component indispensable
to the functioning of some other device which utilizes atomic energy. In medieval
times a kingdom was allegedly lost for want of a nail; in our interdependent tech-
nology a gigantic war machine almost came to a halt because of a shortage of
special one-inch aircraft screws.24 In the air war against Germany the planners
216o STAT. 755, 42 U. S. C. A. §i8ox(a) (Supp. 1946).
"6o STAT. 755, 42 U. S. C. A. §i8oi(b)(4) (Supp. 1946).
2"6o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §I8Ia(c)(2) (Supp. 1946).
2 The famous wartime bottleneck involving the product of Jack and Heinz Precision Industries, Inc.,
Cleveland, Ohio.
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agreed that ball bearings were essential to the whole economy and that ball-bearing
plants must have first priority as targets. These examples are cited to show that
"essential" as used in the text is essentially undefinable. It is likely that the Com-
mission will first decide whether the licensing of an invention "is necessary to
effectuate the policies and purposes of this Act"--the second condition, to which we
shall turn in a moment-and, if this is decided affirmatively, then determine
whether the invention is actually "essential." On occasion it may be necessary
to adopt the tactics of Procrustes.
As for the second condition-that the licensing of an invention must be found
"necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes of the Act"--this seems to confer
upon the Commission a very broad discretion. It is clearly designed to empower
the Commission, on broad social or economic grounds, to liberate any or all devices
needed in the development of atomic energy from the coils of the patent system.
This section confers on the Commission sweeping powers to avoid and remove
obstacles to the positive development of atomic energy in accordance with the con-
structive purposes of the Act. There is, however, one gaping omission which must
be attributed to a flaw in draftsmanship. This is the failure to make any provision
whereby the benefits of atomic energy developments in medical therapy can be made
freely available. In their anxiety to provide maximum freedom for medical use of
atomic energy, the legislative draftsmen exempted this category from the licensing
provisions of Section 7. In drafting subsection ii(c), they provided that all patents
declared affected with the public interest might be used by any person holding a
license under Section 7. This exclusion of medical therapy was nowhere else cor-
rected. Thus we have the interesting result that the use of a patent to extort
unreasonable profits in, say, the utilization of an atomic energy battery is effectively
prevented, but the inventor of an atomic energy device useful in the treatment of
cancer is free to patent the device, and make such charges for it as the traffic will
bear. If abuses develop in this field, it may be necessary to remedy this flaw by
legislative amendment.
The powers of the Commission derived from subsection ii(c) must be regarded
in conjunction with its licensing powers under Section 7. Together they form a
single instrument of single purpose, namely, to promote the usefulness of atomic
energy in the public interest. Materials, facilities, and scientific manpower are all
limited. Within the bounds of its authority the Commission must, in effect, allo-
cate resources to meet competing.requirements. A system of priorities based on a
policy reflecting the principal objectives of the Act must govern the allocations.
The authority to license the manufacture of atomic energy devices is an integral
part of any allocation policy. The complement of this authority is the authority
to compel the licensing (and to fix royalties) of patents covering devices needed for
such manufacture.
Without this compulsory licensing provision, the holder of a patent on an ordi-
nary atomic energy device or an ancillary device might be in position to prevent
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altogether the manufacture of some device---or even a number of devices-duly
licensed by the Commission under Section 7. For the patented device might be an
essential component of the other, and if the patent holder refused to license the use
of his device, or demanded excessive royalties, the manufacturer licensed under
Section 7 could get no relief. Thus the owner of a patent covering a device uniquely
essential to the manufacture of several types of atomic energy devices could domi-
nate the industry by the appropriate manipulation of his licensing power.
Compulsory licensing does not represent a startling innovation in the patent
system of capitalist countries. A statute incorporating such a principle has been
in force in the United Kingdom since 1883," and a similar Act has been repeatedly
urged in the United States during the past half century.
Proposals for compulsory licensing in the United States, however, have always
been most bitterly opposed by the beneficiaries of the present system, since to remove
the power to strangle competition is considerably to diminish the economic signifi-
cance of patents. In the discussions of the patent section of the Atomic Energy
Act in Congress, the compulsory licensing feature was the object of the most
vehement attacks-some of them bordering on hysteria. A former assistant patent
comissioner, for example, warned the House Military Affairs Committee that the
patent section of the Act was copied directly from the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
-with minor changes to allow for the difference in idiom. The sensation created
by this revelation was only slightly mitigated by the fact that the provision had been
drafted by an eleven-man blue ribbon Senate Committee and had been adopted
unanimously by the United States Senate.
IV
PRocEDuREs POR REPORTING PRODUCTION DEvICES AND MILITARY WEAPONS
With certain vital areas of nuclear technology in the non-patentable zone, the
Commission instead of the Patent Office becomes the central agency to which in-
ventors operating in these areas apply. Section ii (a) (3) covers the point adequately
as follows:
(i) Any inventor or discoverer of a device or process useful in the production of
fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for
a military weapon must file with the Commission within a specified time a detailed
description of the device or process;
(2) The time specified is sixty days after the enactment of the Act (September
30, 1946) in the case of inventions and discoveries previously made, and, in the case
of new inventions or discoveries, not later than the sixtieth day after such invention
or discovery. This completion date is unavoidably a vague concept, and the Com-
mission will probably be required to interpret it afresh in each new case arising
under this subsection. The essential consideration should be the good faith of the
inventor in reporting his accomplishment as soon as he has reason to believe 't
" Patents, Designs & Trade Marks Act, 46 & 47 VICr. C. 57, §22 (1883).
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workable and useful. The Commission's general inspecting activities in the field
of atomic energy projects, and its authority to require periodic reports, should con-
siderably simplify the enforcement problem in this field.
Since nuclear research and engineering is a new field, largely shrouded by security
regulations, it may be expected that for some time to come inventions or discoveries
will be made which will have significance for the production of fissionable material
or for its utilization for a military weapon, without the inventor's being aware of
the fact. In order to provide for this possibility, subsection ii (a) (3) (c) authorizes
the inventor unaware of the significance of his invention to file application for a
patent in the usual way, or, in the event he has not made such application, to file a
report within sixty days after he first discovers or has reason to believe that his
invention falls into the category established by this subsection.
Great skill will be needed for the effective enforcement of the provisions of this
subsection. The Commission must have prompt and detailed reports on all new
developments in atomic energy, in order to conduct its production and research
programs, and it cannot assume that the provisions cited will automatically produce
this result. The willing cooperation of the inventor must be enlisted; otherwise he
can pretend that the invention is not yet "completed," or that he is unaware of its
importance to atomic energy. Everything possible must be done by the Commission
to correct misapprehension, wilfully cultivated by some of the opponents of the
patent section, of the effect of these provisions, and to demonstrate that the Act
neither destroys the patent system nor takes away the inventor's property without
compensation. The examination of reports on new inventions, and the making of
compensatory awards where the usefulness of the invention justifies compensation,
should be accomplished with a minimum of "bureaucratic" delay. If it becomes
recognized that the efficiency of the Commission in processing reports compares
favorably with analogous procedures performed by the Commissioner of Patents,
and that the compensation awarded inventors is based on a fair, consistent and com-
prehensive policy, cooperation will be readily forthcoming. Admittedly, the determi-
nation of awards will be among the most difficult functions to be performed by the
Commission; but this is merely to say that the task merits extraordinary effort.
V
COMPULSORY LICENSING AND ROYALTIES
The Commission has authority to compel the licensing of patents, and thereby
it can check the growth of monopoly and encourage competition in this new field.
A provision for compulsory licensing requires a provision controlling royalties to
complement it, for otherwise the patent holder could peg royalties at a prohibitive
rate.
The Act meets this point by providing that "the owner of the patent shall be
entitled to a reasonable royalty fee" which may be agreed upon by the owner and
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licensee (under Section 7). But if they are unable to reach an agreement the royalty
rate is to be determined by the Commission.20
Supplementary support for the compulsory licensing and royalty fixing mechan-
ism is provided in Section i (c)(3). The principal features of this section are as
follow:
(i) No court may enjoin a licensee, under Section 7, from using a patented in-
vention declared to be affected with the public interest under Section ii(c)(i).
While the licensee is automatically entitled to use such a patented invention, it will
be recalled that he may do so only "to the extent such invention or discovery is used
by him in carrying on the activities authorized by his license.... ." Presumably, there-
fore, if the patented invention is used for purposes outside the scope of the license,
a court of competent jurisdiction would not be prohibited from issuing an injunction
in an action for infringement by the patent holder;
(2) Assume the court finds that the defendant licensee is actually using the
patented device, but royalties have neither been agreed upon nor determined by
the Commission. This circumstance might arise either where the licensee is unaware
of the existence of a patent on the device used by him, or where, in his opinion, he
is not actually infringing the patent. In that case the court shall "stay the proceeding
until the royalty fee is determined pursuant to this section." The measure of
damages, once the royalty is determined, is the royalty fee, "together with such costs,
interest, and reasonable attorney's fees as may be fixed by the Court";
(3) Where royalties have been fixed by arrangement between the parties or by
the Commission, and a licensee then fails to pay, "the patentee may bring an action
in any court of competent jurisdiction" for his royalty fee, costs, etc.
VI
PowER To REQuIsITIoN AND CONDEMN PATENTS
In addition to the patent revocation and compulsory licensing authority, the Com-
mission, under subsection ii(d), is authorized to purchase, take, requisition or con-
demn any invention or discovery useful in the production of fissionable material,
useful in the utilization of atomic weapons, or which "utilizes or is essential in the
utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy," as well as patents or patent
applications covering such inventions or discoveries.
The scope of this authority parallels that of subsections ii(a) and ii(c). Thus
patents on multiple-use production devices, military weapons, and utilization devices,
only partially revoked or restricted by the provisions already discussed, may be
wholly taken over by the Commission in the exercise of its condemnation power. It
is also worth noting that while medical patents are not subject to compulsory
licensing, they are nevertheless subject to condemnation as patents on inventions
utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy.
This too is an innovation in governmental powers as regards patents, but it
2 6o SAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §I811(c)(2) (Supp. 1946).
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forms a logical supplement to the Commission's general authority in this field. It
enables the Commission to deal speedily and effectively with uncooperative patent
owners. It provides an instrument which may prove useful in protecting the
national security. It is possible, for example, that multiple-use inventions useful
in the production of fissionable material or in certain ordinary atomic energy devices
might incorporate data which it is determined on security grounds should be re-
stricted. Under its broad acquisition authority, the Commission could take over the
inventions and patents and safeguard them until the data they incorporated has been
removed from the restricted category. Since just compensation must be made in
every case, and all awards, as will be seen below, are subject to court review, the
property rights of patent owners are adequately protected.
The Commissioner of Patents is required to notify the Commission "of all appli-
cations for patents heretofore or hereafter filed" which in his opinion disclose an
invention or discovery of the type which the Commission is empowered to acquire-
that is, atomic energy devices of virtually every type. The Commissioner of Patents
is also required to provide the Commission access to all such applications. While
this provision is essential to the Commission's discharge of its function of acquiring
patents, it is of considerable importance to the performance of certain other functions
of the Commission as well. It provides the Commission with an invaluable source
of information as to new technological developments, information useful in its
research, engineering, and production programs, and should be useful as a supple-
mentary check on monopolistic trends and in the enforcement of security controls.
At every stage of the development of the applications of atomic energy, problems
will arise jointly affecting the responsibilities of the Commission and the Patent
Office. It is clear that the cooperation between these two agencies must not be
limited to the formalism of the reporting provision of the present section, but must
be vital, close, and continuous.
VII
COMPENSATION
A. Eligibility
Applications for compensation for patents wholly or partially revoked or for the
establishment of royalty rates are to be considered by a Patent Compensation Board
consisting of two or more employees of the Commission. Final determinations are
subject to the approval of the Commission. The draftsmen of the Act made an
earnest endeavor to set forth, as guides for the Commission, a framework of stand-
ards from which a coherent compensation policy might be evolved. Nevertheless,
the Commission is certain to find performance of its functions in this area difficult
and vexatious.
Before examining these standards it may be useful to list the classes of applicants
eligible for awards:
i. The owner of a patent for production of fissionable materials or military
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weapons, or which is useful in atomic energy research, may apply for just compensa-
tion;2
7
2. The owner of a patent declared affected with the public interest may apply for
the "determination of a reasonable royalty fee" for the use of his patent, or a licensee
under Section 7 may apply for the same purpose; 28
3. The owner of any invention or discovery, or of any patent covering such
discovery, which is taken by the Commission may apply for just compensation; 21
4. Any person making an invention or discovery useful in the production of
fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for
a military weapon, and whose patent rights have been limited or abolished by sub-
section (a), may apply for an award30
This review of eligible persons reveals that every inventor of a device useful in
the technology of atomic energy is eligible, according to circumstance, either for an
"award," "just compensation," or "reasonable royalties."
B. Standards for Determining Compensation
The categories of persons entitled to compensation under the Act having been
examined, there remain for consideration the standards which are established for
the guidance of the Commission in making its findings. As set forth in subsection
ii(e) (3), these standards are first described for the determination of royalties, and
are then applied in toto to other types of compensation cases, supplemented by
consideration of the actual use of the invention or discovery in question. An
analysis of the provisions of this subsection follows.
In determining a "reasonable" royalty fee, the Commission is instructed to "take
into consideration any defense, general or special, that might be pleaded by a
defendant in any action for infringement. . . ." This, in effect, restates a general
operating principle in patent law, often invoked in determining compensation to be
paid patent owners whose inventions are used by or for the government without their
consent. In other words, when the Patent Compensation Board weighs a claim for
royalties on a patent, it may consider such factors as would have constituted a partial
or total defense to a claim for royalties-and damages in a court of law, had the same
patent been the subject of an action for infringement.
The Commission is further instructed to take into consideration "the extent to
which, if any, such patent was developed through federally financed research.'
This is an apparently unassailable general principle, but one which must be regarded
as something less than firmly established for the whole field of federally financed
research. The struggle to determine who shall be the beneficiaries of the discoveries
and inventions made possible by the expenditure of government funds during the
war has already been joined, though so far it has been concealed from public
176o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §§iAxi(a)(x), iSII(a)(2), and i&xii(b) (Supp. 1946).
- 6o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §i8ii(c)(2) (Supp. 1946).
"96o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §ix8(d) (Supp. 1946).
*06o STAT. 768, 42 U. S. C. A. §i8x1(e)(2) (Supp. 1946).
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attention3 1 The Department of Justice wishes the government to retain control of
patents on inventions produced by the expenditure of government funds, and to
use the licensing of devices covered by these patents as a weapon for combating
monopoly. Opponents of this radical and possibly effective means of achieving
orthodox but for the most part merely pietistic ends have been vigorously, albeit
silently, at work both outside and inside the government. Their chances to achieve
their purpose-given the temper of the times-seem better than good. In the
Atomic Energy Act, however, the principle is explicitly established. Since the
release of atomic energy and its technology were, beyond any possible argument,
made possible entirely by the expenditure of public funds, this is by no means a
narrow application of the principle.
Thus, it is established that an atomic energy device incorporating scientific dis-
coveries made as a result of the expenditure of public funds, or one developed in
a federally financed project, is not to be regarded as private property, requiring
the payment of royalties. A manufacturer is entitled to a fair profit for making
such a device, but additional compensation in the form of royalties, when there is
no risk and perhaps in some cases no originality involved, cannot be justified.
The Commission is required to consider also "the degree of utility, novelty, and
importance of the invention or discovery." This is the heart of the valuation prob-
lem. Unfortunately it is also the most difficult. An invention to be patentable
must be "new" and "useful." Yet these are conditions which, borrowing from the
apt jargon of mathematical proofs, are necessary but not sufficient. How new?
How useful? Inventions incorporating no more than petty improvements or vari-
ations proliferate at an amazing rate. The Patent Office is usually swamped with
this species and the Commission may expect the same deluge when the technology
of atomic energy has been more fully elaborated.
It should be noted that in attempting to set a price on "novelty" and "utility"
no exact analogy is to be found in a hypothetical action for infringement. In an
infringement action the damages awarded the patent holder may incorporate a
punitive element in addition to the loss of profits sustained by the plaintiff. In de-
termining royalties under the Act, the punitive factor will not be present, except
that where royalties were previously fixed and the licensee under Section 7 failed
to pay, or where the licensee knowingly infringed on an existing patent, the licensee
may be liable for damages and costs in addition. Moreover, the determination of
reasonable royalties, on the basis of hypothetical profits which might be derived
from the sales (if sales were permitted) of untried devices in an unknown field,
presents problems which would tax the powers of a corps of clairvoyants. The
Commission must undertake the task aided only by such perception as lawyers,
economists, scientists, and businessmen can bring to bear. The onus of demonstrating
31 However, a real beginning has at last been made in the Attorney General's patent report. See
U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF TnE A1rrORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT (3 vOls. 1947).
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the novelty and utility of the device must fall on the applicant, and the Commission
will probably maintain an attitude of open-minded and judicious skepticism. The
task will be most difficult in the early stages, and will become easier with the growth
of experience and a body of precedents.
The Commission "may consider the cost to the owner of the patent of developing
such invention or discovery or acquiring such patent." This factor was deliberately
made optional, for in developing any invention the financial investment may vary
from a small sum to an amount out of all proportion to the value of the final prod-
uct. In the realm of ordinary commercial affairs, where the cost of developing a de-
vice has been unduly high royalties can be fixed at a level sufficient fully to cover
costs only if the device is of key importance and satisfactory substitutes are not avail-
able. Possession of such a device may enable the patent holder to gain a dominating
position in the economics of an entire industry. Charged with carrying out the
broad social and economic objectives of the Act, the Commission, of course, cannot
permit royalties on key devices to be fixed so high that small manufacturers are
excluded from the field. In some instances it may be necessary for the Commission
to acquire a patent outright in order to accomplish the dual purpose of making the
invention it covers widely available, and of compensating the patent holder for costs
incurred. When the Commission acquires a patent on a device and makes it avail-
able for use by private persons, it may decide to charge a moderate royalty fee
sufficient over a period of years to recoup its outlay. The Act does not explicitly
authorize this procedure but it is reasonable to infer that it would be justified.
In addition to these provisions, which by guaranteeing fair compensation seek to
encourage private invention, the Commission has authority under Section 3 to
finance private research projects under appropriate financial arrangements. In con-
sonance with the general policy objectives of the Act, it appears that the Commission
should make inventions developed under this arrangement fully and freely available.
If this is indeed the policy followed, it is to be expected that industry will normally
prefer to finance its own projects except when these involve large expenditures
coupled with tenuous prospects of success. Nevertheless, arrangements made under
this authority may be very important in contributing to the work of independent
inventors who are hampered in their investigations by inadequate funds.
The same considerations apply to the determination of compensation for the
various types of patents wholly or partially revoked under subsections ii (a), ixi(b),
and ix(d), and for the granting of awards authorized by subsection xx (e) (2) (C),
to persons not entitled to compensation under the subsections cited. In addition to
these considerations the Commission is required to take into account "the actual
use of such invention or discovery." The Commission is given discretion to pay
the amount decided upon either in a lump sum or in periodic payments.
C. judicial Review of Compensation
Any inventor or patent owner dissatisfied with the amount or terms of the award
or royalty set by the Commission may obtain a judicial review of the Commission's
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determination. The procedure to be followed is similar to that established in other
regulatory statutes, such as the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Securities Ex-
change Act, and the Federal Communications Act. The aggrieved person files in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia a written petition asking that
the determination be set aside. The Commission, upon being served with a copy
of this petition, files with the Court a certified transcript of the entire record.
The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence, and the case is decided upon this record, the Court having the authority to
affirm the determination of the Commission in its entirety or to remand it to the
Commission for further proceedings.
, The requirement that the review proceedings be brought in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia follows the Federal Communications Act. The facts
in these cases will usually be complex and often involve restricted data; limiting
review to a single appellate court should serve the double purpose of enabling the
court to develop experience in the field of atomic energy and holding to a minimum
the number of judges to whom confidential material is entrusted. In reviewing the
Commission's determinations the court is governed by the terms of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, which provides that the only ground for setting aside such an ad-
ministrative determination is that it is arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by sub-
stantial evidence32 The Court's decision is subject to further review by the United
States Supreme Court if certiorari is granted upon petition of the Commission or
any party to the court proceeding.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Upon analysis, this painstakingly fair and even generous section of the Act seems
scarcely to merit the extravagant abuse which has been directed against it. The
section takes scrupulous care that no rights are infringed without just compensation,
and that no future discoveries or inventions in the field of atomic energy shall fail of
adequate reward. What it does, of course, is to intrude rudely into certain sanctuaries
of the patent system 'egarded as sacred, not by scientists and inventors, but by
practitioners of the art of economic manipulation. The conclusion is difficult to
escape that these were the persons offended, and that the aspect of the patent pro-
vision which outraged them most was not its failure to make adequate financial
compensation for any property rights it impaired, but the simple and efficient way
in which it eliminated from a whole vast area of enormous potential economic sig-
nificance all possibility of manipulating patents as an instrument for achieving privi-
leged position and monopoly control.
3 60 STAT. 243, U. S. C. A. §xoog(e) (Supp. 1946).
